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Liam Baldwin
Dr. Magalhães
Poli Sci 340
28 April 2017
The Venezuelan Diaspora: A Cerebral Exodus
For decades, Venezuela remained a destination for immigrants from all over Latin
America and Spain. Refugees from both Pinochet and Franco’s regimes sought asylum in the
country, and Venezuela took advantage of its escalating labor supply by consolidating workers
into its petroleum market. This rich market gave way to even more immigration from Latin
America. However, the past two decades have seen the absolute reverse of this pattern as 1.2-1.6
million Venezuelans have left the country, representing about six percent of the entire
Venezuelan population (Páez). Though Venezuelans’ reasons for migration vary, as many of
them cite violence, political instability, or economic difficulties as their impetus to leave, the
effects on the country have been largely economic and pose an even bigger threat twenty years
down the road. This surge in emigration also poses humanitarian threats as migrants are forced
into dangerous situations crossing closed borders. The current phase of the Venezuelan diaspora
hinges on the evolution of a culture of uncertainty, in which multiple factors, such as the
crumbling economy and increasing crime rates, contribute to the general anxiety the public feels.
I will first examine the nature of the phenomenon of “brain drain” and the ways in which it poses
a threat to Venezuela. Then, I will consider emigrants’ reasons for leaving the country, bearing in
mind the principal theme of Venezuelan disquietude. Finally, I will explore possible remedies to
the human capital crisis that the country is experiencing.
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The steady trickle of citizens leaving the Venezuelan borders is a symptom of the current
economic woes of the country. On account of binding price controls and spiraling inflation rates,
one economist has found that Venezuela currently ranks first on the “misery index,” a metric that
compares government favorability polls and an aggregate measurement of inflation and
unemployment minus GDP (Hanke). The dire economic circumstances have been the impetus for
six percent of the country’s population leaving—between 1.2 and 1.5 million people over the
past two decades (Paéz). However, the worrying part of these numbers lies in the demographics
of who is emigrating. One study found that 25- to 34-year-olds make up 33.5 percent of the
emigrants (Loginow), which creates problems for economies because of the loss of an energetic
work force. Economic development relies on robust populations that are willing to work, so the
depletion of Venezuela’s young people could signal future economic troubles. But the loss of
this demographic poses a threat mostly to the older populations in the future—those above 50—
because as they look to retire, they will find substantial portions of the working economy unable
to support their retirement (Loginow).
Another challenge for these older generations will come from the substantial and
alarming loss of medical professionals within the country, especially as these generations age to
the point where they require constant medical support. Quite simply, older people require
significantly more medical attention. However, because of the increasing international demand
for workers in the medical sector, 6.9% of the medical professionals registered with el ministerio
del poder popular para la Salud, a public institution whose goal is to promote healthy practices
through guaranteed access to health services, emigrated from the country between 2008 and 2009
(Hernández). Although the increasing emigration is largely symptomatic of the worsening
economy, these statistics predict the possibility of humanitarian crises related to health within the
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next few decades. A country with a large elderly population and a scarcity of medical
professionals will have to rely on foreign aid in order to provide this basic human right for its
people.
Within the private sector, companies find themselves hurting as well, especially because
of difficulty retaining young employees who seek better opportunities abroad. Not only do
younger workers generally leap-frog from job to job in search of better economic opportunities,
but private companies get hit with a one-two punch as they face increasing competition for
laborers from other companies. Couple this increasing competition with high rates of inflation,
employers find themselves at a loss as to what to do. While inflation has made basic living a
struggle in terms of even supplying oneself with food and other necessary goods, salary averages
hardly budged between 2000 and 2008 (Torres). The desire to leave the country is of course
obvious because young workers face incredibly high opportunity costs if they decide to stay,
foregoing the possibility of making a much easier living in another country. This phenomenon of
“brain drain” consists of the loss of energetic, specialized workers, preventing the economy from
growing.
But the largest humanitarian crisis comes from the sheer process of mass migration itself.
As residents flood to border towns such as Cúcuta, Colombia, migrants account for up to 65
percent of all hospital visits, and many patients treated suffer from sexually transmitted diseases
with the arrival of prostitutes (Lopes). Health crises such as this are just one of many other
crises. After Venezuela closed its Colombian border formally in 2015, migrants were forced to
take riskier trips back and forth across the border to buy food, crossing streams and forests in the
middle of the night to avoid security guards (Lopes). The plight of migrants is a universal issue,
but when crossing borders becomes increasingly more difficult, migrants naturally resort to more
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dangerous processes of reaching destinations. This poses an enormous humanitarian threat for
the safety of migrants.
Past surges in immigration to Venezuela helped to forge the strong oil-based economy
that dominated the world for so many years. However, with the complete reversal of this trend,
the country faces problems both humanitarian and economic in nature. This trend of emigration
is not a cause of underdevelopment, but rather a symptom. Regardless, it poses problems for
future development, especially as the country attempts to fix the economic and political problems
that trouble it. In other words, although brain drain historically was never a problem for
Venezuela, it could launch the country back economically by decades and inhibit further
development.
The causes of massive emigration are complex and numerous simply because migrants
are not a monolithic demographic. Each person migrates for his or her own individual reasons.
However, certain systemic problems in the country are easily identifiable and shed light on why
bright, young Venezuelans are so eager to leave.
A primary obstacle Venezuela faces currently is the lack of housing, and the general lack
of reliable infrastructure. This is most evident in the city of Caracas, where informal settlements
have been growing on the city’s periphery for years, expanding slowly onto the mountainsides,
creating labyrinths of streets and makeshift houses. The essay “Squatter City” by Michael
Eamonn Miller aptly demonstrates the lived experience of several people who are forced to build
homes in informal settlements, and he portrays the feelings of anxiety many of these citizens
feel, but what is more striking is the photo essay juxtaposed with Miller’s article. Photographer
Alvaro Ybarra Zavala documents the chaotic nature of the housing problems, showing the urban
sprawl slowly reaching its fingers over the mountainside as well as the intimidating height of
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high-rise slums (Miller). Not only does Caracas face the challenge of low-quality homes, but also
it also simply lacks housing. The UN Habitat estimated in 2015 that Venezuela needs 2.5 million
new homes, and this need is mostly concentrated in the capitol city (Miller 198). The issue of
housing, of course, is augmented by the city’s crumbling infrastructure. Informal settlements
have to resort to stealing electricity and siphoning water from larger pipelines, and roads and
bridges are often in states of disrepair (Miller 200). To put it bluntly, the low-quality
infrastructure of this growing city makes life simply inconvenient in the city, providing little
incentive for young workers to stay, and the lack of access to housing does not help the matter
either. Uncertainty regarding housing and infrastructure is at its core an uncertainty regarding the
most fundamental parts of life, creating a shared cultural anxiety that drives young Venezuelans
out of the country.
On top of housing insecurities, young Venezuelans face myriad economic obstacles in
their path to unemployment as well. Much of this can be traced to the country’s severe
dependence on oil exports as its primary source of GDP. Although only one percent of the
Venezuelan labor force in 1997 was employed in the extractive industries, their revenue
accounted for approximately 23 percent of the country’s GDP (Jonakin 1291). Despite the high
level of skill required for mining and petroleum operations, both industries experience the same
struggles as many resource economies: not only are prices dependent on the global market’s
capricious demands for primary resources, but also the industries do not promote the
development of other complementary industries. The trend of neoliberal foreign direct
investment may have increased the GDP of the nation, but it failed to create stable job markets
that could pose long-term labor opportunities in Venezuela.
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The most recent decade has seen similarly dismaying job prospects, especially for young
people, contributing to the exodus of young workers. The years 2013-2015 experienced
significant decay in the GDP for virtually all industries, including construction, manufacturing,
transportation, services, and mining (Palmo 13). Young, educated Venezuelans face a difficult
choice: stay in Venezuela, where job prospects are low even for people with high levels of
formal education, or move to another country in Latin America and find economic stability. The
economic insecurity Venezuelans face is likely the most salient reason for the country’s brain
drain, as young people face enormous uncertainties regarding their careers, especially when they
consider the country’s future economic projections.
The Venezuelan diaspora is also largely driven by crime, which contributes to the culture
of fear in a different way than economic uncertainty does. Fear of death, the most primal fear
among human, a fear that has inspired belabored existential writings for centuries, threatens the
very livelihood of a person, and Venezuela’s ever-increasing crime rate does little to pacify the
masses. The United States Department of State reports that in 2012, Venezuela had 72 deaths per
100,000 people, ranking its murder rate as one of the top five in the world (Venezuela Country).
Venezuelan sociologist Roberto Briceño-León organizes Venezuelan violence into three phases.
The first phase, which he calls “institutional crisis,” lasted from 1989-1993, which represented a
break in the social pact against violence (Briceño-León 15). In this phase, Briceño-León argues
that violence was legitimized as a political tool to achieve goals, culminating in a murder rate of
21 per 100,000 by the end of 1993 (15). The second phase from 1994-1998, was characterized by
the stabilization of the homicide rate, as president Rafael Caldera made long strides to restore
faith in the institution (16). The final phase, which he calls “institutional destruction,” began in
1999 and continues to this day, marked by an incrementally increasing murder rate and further
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legitimization of violence as a political tool (17). Rather than viewing violence as merely a
product of the increase in poverty, Briceño-León emphasizes the systematic aspect of the
increase in violence. The cultural acceptance of violence relates directly to a culture of fear, one
in which one’s very own safety is not guaranteed. Faced with mounting anxiety about murder,
young Venezuelans choose to leave because of the daily threat of violence. Violence has, in a
way, become normalized in the country, such that some justify violence to accomplish their own
personal goals now.
Of course, the precarious financial position Venezuela finds itself in limits its options of
fixing the problem, especially as the national debt continues to skyrocket. The country has spent
most of its efforts to control rising prices and a growing debt and has not been able to
concentrate on retaining its intellectual workers. However, a focus on putting a plug on the drain
of human capital from the country would address a symptom of Venezuela’s problems and
would likely not lead to long-lasting economic growth. What I therefore propose is a life-givesyou-lemons approach to Venezuela’s brain drain, which is strongly grounded both theoretically
and tangibly. The country must take advantage of its fiscal situation to look ahead and make
investments that could boost growth years down the road. This approach seeks to exploit both the
high numbers of Venezuelans living abroad as well as the low costs of skilled labor within the
country.
As the depletion of intellectual personnel is a problem not just limited to Venezuela,
economists have written extensively on it in order to find remedies. Current literature tends to
center itself on the positive effects of brain drain on an economy (such as remittances sent from
developed nations that convert rather lucratively to local currency), but economist Jagdish
Bhagwati proposed a controversial idea in 1972 that looked to capitalize on emigrating
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demographics through taxation. Through two edited volumes of his idea, Bhagwati explores the
effect of emigration on tax policy, arguing that taxes on professionals living abroad could
substantially increase a country’s revenue (Wilson 2). Of note is his argument that not taxing
citizens abroad leads to a “representation without taxation” (3) because citizens retain their legal
rights under the government, such as the right to vote (3). Why should a professional who has
immigrated to another country receive the same rights as a loyal citizen, despite not paying any
taxes at all? This brain-drain tax also acts as an incentive for some professionals to stay in the
country if they fear being doubly taxed both in their country of origin as well as their home
country. While John Douglas Wilson, an economics professor at Michigan State University,
argues that a certain level of cooperation between host governments and developing-country
governments may eventually be necessary in order to avoid this double taxation, what could be
most effective immediately for Venezuela is a low tax rate applicable to all Venezuelans working
abroad immediately, which could help give the country a boost during these trying times (9).
Critics of Bhagwati’s proposal point out the serious flaws in emigration taxes, which
could prevent the tax from being applied to Venezuelans abroad. Primarily, a tax like this would
come as a bureaucratic nightmare to the country because it would require the taxes to go through
a neutral party—namely, the UN. The development of formal taxation processes would cost
millions for an already swamped government that is trying to suppress ballooning prices. This is
a legitimate critique of the plan; however, its efficacy may be more likely down the road as the
country (hopefully) halts the growing inflation. For this reason, an emigration tax may be a
stronger policy option after the country picks itself up again.
The life-and lemons approach is more applicable in terms of the technology industry,
which has seen a surprising amount of growth despite Venezuela’s tough economic climate for
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startups. Tech companies have found a sort of wage haven in which desperate employees are
willing to take software development jobs for relatively low wages as opposed to emigrating.
These fields could prevent the exodus of hundreds of thousands of valuable young people. But
the government’s incapability of providing investments to this field has created an investment
vacuum that one independent company has filled: Wayra. This Caracas-based startupacceleration company has provided funding for 31 technology-based projects since 2012,
filtering applications from a wide pool of 1,849 projects and accepting only 1.29% of applicants
(Wayra). Of note are startups such as Pollito, which has created a social networking site for
mothers to exchange used baby toys; Singular, an augmented reality platform that designs
interactive programming for clients; and DLN, a website whose purpose is to teach English to
Venezuelans in a more compelling way by featuring completely nude teachers (Wayra).
Companies such as Wayra offer a sliver of hope to a country with a draining source of human
capital by promoting the tech industry in a tech-driven world. Advertisements to foreign
investors are therefore crucial. With inflation rates so high, a US dollar will go significantly
further in Venezuela than it will in the US in terms of labor costs, so Wayra and similar
companies must begin to advertise their firm and its capabilities to an international audience in
order to provide water to this flowering industry.
The Bolivarian Revolution certainly indicated the Venezuelan government’s
understanding of the importance of technological training, so the process of creating a strong
technological industry has been in the works for years. Ideologically, the Revolution sought to
create a social economy that would work for all people by closing economic gaps between social
classes, as opposed to the capitalist system that pits competing interests against each other and
widens gaps between classes (Haydee et al., 36). From this search for a social economy came the
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development of technological information centers across the country, featuring high-quality
computers as well as informal training on basic computer processes (41). These centers in theory
work to decrease the technology gap between the rich and poor by offering the less economically
advantaged populations a chance to learn skills they would need in most job markets and
subsequently develop the technology industry. Though this policy was not originally created to
retain young workers in the country, it acted as one of the first steps in fostering the technology
industry by giving more people the opportunity to enter the sector. However, over the next few
years, the ever-increasing inflation may act as a strong impediment to whatever progress these
centers make.
The Venezuelan diaspora has uprooted over a million people, a process that has changed
the country from a nation of immigrants into a nation of emigrants. Amidst political, social, and
economic tensions, young Venezuelans find it difficult to remain in the country, so they opt to
relocate themselves abroad, carrying with them invaluable intellectual resources that deepen the
economic crisis of the country. A whole host of problems arises from this, but most prominent
are the economic and humanitarian issues that threaten the lives of Venezuelans today. Hope is
fleeting, too, as efforts to incentivize young workers to stay will likely yield little results. What is
needed in Venezuela can perhaps not be attained through policies or investments. Instead, greater
support for migrant networks, medical centers, and an economic bailout would help to ease the
suffering of these people as they go through turmoil. Or, perhaps Maduro needs to step down and
hand over the reigns.
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Other paragraphs: Investments in the tech industry. Define Bolivarian economy—how does this
relate to FDI? Argue that Venezuela should encourage tech startups because it is a growing field,
and an emphasis on that part of the economy will drive more people to study that and become
software engineers.
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Páez, Tomás. La voz de la diáspora venezolana. Madrid: Catarata, 2015. Print.
Palmo, Pedro A. “La Inflación en Venezuela: Sus Causas y Corección.” Debates IESA, vol. 21,
issue 1, 2016, 10-14.
Ruiz, Alexander Niño. "Formal and Informal Housing Practices in Bogotá, Colombia: The
experience of Metrovivienda and Juan XXIII." Revista de Derecho Privado 36 (2006):
183-206.

13
Torres, Carmen Cecilia. “Los cambios de la compensación.” Debates IESA, vol. 13, issue 4,
2008, p 26.
“Venezuela Country Specific Information.” Travel.State.Gov, U.S. Department of State, 20 Aug.
2013. Accessed 12 Apr. 2017.
“Welcome to Wayra Venezuela.” Telefónica. Web. 26 April 2017.
Wilson, John Douglas. "Taxing the brain drain: A reassessment of the Bhagwati proposal."
Trade, Globalization, and Poverty (2008): 254-262.

